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 THE PRODUCTIVITY EFFECTS OF MULTIPLE PAY INCENTIVES 
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1. Introduction 
 
An increasing proportion of companies and workplaces use multiple pay incentives for 
their employees.  Nearly forty per cent of British workplaces used two or more incentive 
systems by the mid-2000s compared with just over twenty per cent two decades earlier 
(Pendleton et al, 2009: 279).  This development in corporate practice is mirrored by 
developments in theory and research on incentives.   Recent theory suggests that multiple 
incentives may be more productive than single incentives because the positive features of 
one can counteract negative effects of another.  A wider range of incentives can spread 
employee effort across a range of desired tasks whereas a single incentive may lead to 
undue focus on just one task.  Furthermore, the addition of incentives that encourage 
employee commitment to the company may counter the dysfunctional employee 
behaviour that often arises from individual incentives (Gibbons, 1998; Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1994; Roberts, 2010).     
 
Despite these developments in theory and practice, there is as yet very little 
empirical evidence on these issues.  A key issue is whether the provision of multiple 
incentives does indeed have the beneficial company outcomes that recent theoretical 
contributions and corporate practice imply. This paper provides new evidence on this 
issue by addressing several inter-related questions that have been posed in the recent 
literature on incentives theory.  Do combinations of incentives have a stronger impact on 
productivity than a single incentive (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994)? Are the effects of 
individual incentives, such as individual payment by results (IPBR), enhanced by the 
addition of apparently weaker incentives such as group payment by results (GPBR) or 
profit sharing (PS)?  Is GPBR or PS more effective in this respect, given that PS would 
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 appear to have weaker incentive effects, as highlighted in the financial participation 
literature (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990)?     
 
The paper addresses these questions using data from the British Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS).  It examines the ‘marginal effects’ of individual 
schemes, and combinations of them, on workplace productivity.  In the first instance, the 
effects are examined for all private sector workplaces in the survey.  Then, drawing on 
contingency approaches suggesting that the effectiveness and appropriateness of pay 
systems will depend on organisational context, the effects of combinations of incentive 
systems are assessed in contrasting work settings.  Specifically we evaluate whether the 
effects of multiple incentives are contingent on the extent of worker discretion and work 
variety.  
 
    The results are supportive of recent theoretical contributions, and provide a 
rationale for the growing use of multiple incentives by companies.  PS in particular plays 
a key role in ‘unlocking’ positive relationships between other payment schemes and 
productivity, even though theoretically it is the weakest incentive because of free rider 
effects and a tenuous ‘line of sight’ between individual effort and measured outcomes 
(Conyon and Freeman, 2004).  Given these apparent weaknesses, we suggest that the 
complementary effects of PS derive from its capacity to engender co-operation and 
reciprocity (Morris and Pinnington, 1998: Coyle et al., 2002). We suggest that it is these 
‘softer’, social-psychological aspects of profit sharing, along with the broader 
performance metrics in profit sharing,that mitigate potentially dysfunctional incentives in 
individual incentive schemes.   
 
These results contribute to the literature in several ways: whereas most recent 
papers evaluating multiple incentives consider the nature and incidence of incentives and 
measurement characteristics (eg. Kauhanen and Napari, 2012), this paper focuses on the 
important issue of outcomes.  In contrast, though, to other papers examining outcomes 
(eg. Barnes et al, 2011), our research examines effects at the workplace rather than 
employee level. The role of profit sharing in particular as a complement to other pay 
 incentives provides a new perspective on the generally positive role of profit sharing 
observed over many years in the financial participation literature (Perotin and Robinson, 
2002). 
 
Prior to presenting the results, the paper outlines our reasoning for expecting 
complementary effects from multiple incentives drawing on recent theory in personnel 
and institutional economics.  The data and methodology is then outlined, prior to 
presentation of the results.  The paper concludes with some observations on the 
limitations of this research and some suggestions for future research.  
 
 
2. Background  
 
There has been a long tradition of research into the operation and effects of 
incentive pay schemes, reflecting persistent and long-standing interest amongst 
companies in finding effective ways to enhance worker performance.  Linking wage 
payments to output or results is said to provide an incentive for workers to expend greater 
effort and thereby generate higher levels of output (Prendergast, 1999).  This proposition 
has been formalised in agency theory, whereby incentives reduce the agency costs of 
monitoring worker effort and output (off-set by the need to pay premiums to compensate 
workers for risk-bearing).  Recent contributions have also highlighted the sorting effects 
of IPBR:  higher pay for higher effort or output will attract higher quality recruits and 
possibly shake-out less productive workers (see Lazear, 2000).  Nearly all of the 
incentives literature in this tradition considers single incentive schemes, be they 
individual PBR, group PBR, profit sharing, share ownership plans, or stock options, in 
isolation from other schemes.   
 
However, there is a growing body of theory, as yet mainly unmatched by 
empirical evidence, which suggests that multiple incentives may be more effective than 
single incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994; Prendergast, 1999; Gibbons, 1998).  
The background to this supposition is the well-known limitations of single incentive 
 schemes, especially those based on individual output or performance.  The need for 
measurement and observability often complicates the design of efficient incentive 
contracts, which in turn dilutes the incentive, requires costly risk premiums, or 
encourages dysfunctional and costly worker behaviour.   The measurement process itself 
may be costly, as exemplified by ‘time and motion’ studies in traditional IPBR.   
 
Following Gibbs et al (2009), the issues with measurement relate to noise, 
distortion, and manipulability (arising from workers’ asymmetric information).  Taking 
each in turn, measurement will be noisy in so far as output is influenced by factors other 
than the employee’s effort, and it is difficult to attribute output precisely to particular 
workers.  This is risky for the (risk-averse) worker/agent.  Risk may be 
controllable/uncontrollable by the worker: where it is under the worker’s control, 
additional incentives may be necessary to encourage the worker to behave appropriately 
(Prendergast, 2002); where it is not, workers will likely seek insurance (guaranteed 
payments for events outside their control) and risk premia.  Agency theory predicts, 
therefore, a trade-off between risk and incentives (Prendergast, 2002), and there is 
evidence that incentive pay is less likely to be used, and less effective, when companies 
face higher product market risk (Bloom and Milkovitch, 1998: 290-291).  A refinement 
of this argument, for which there is some empirical support, is that worker discretion 
moderates the risk-incentives relationship.  Where workers have discretion, incentives 
help them to make the right choices under uncertainty (Devanna and Kurtulis, 2011). 
 
Distortion occurs where the incentive causes the worker to devote inappropriate 
effort or attention to one aspect of their job (typically the element rewarded by the 
incentive payment).  This reflects the difficulty of designing measurement systems that 
adequately capture the distribution and weighting of tasks.  Distortion is likely to increase 
with task range and complexity.  For this reason, individual incentives may be less 
effective where workers have discretion to organise their work tasks.  Individual 
incentives may also be costly where managers want workers to experiment or innovate 
because new methods are not captured by the incentive scheme (Roberts, 2010).  The 
solution may be to increase the number of dimensions of measurement, which is 
 potentially costly, or else to add new types of incentive so as to encourage a spread of 
effort across the range of tasks.   
 
Manipulation occurs where workers can exploit asymmetric information about the 
production process to secure incentive payments.  Classic micro-sociological studies by 
Roy (1952) in the USA and Lupton (1963) in Britain showed how piece work gave rise to 
hoarding of output (giving workers de facto discretion over daily effort), manipulation of 
task times, and restriction of effort and output.  IPBR can also generate low trust, and 
hence encourage manipulation, by signalling that managers lack faith in the capability or 
motivation of workers to perform tasks or that the desired results are difficult to achieve 
(Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Gneezy et al., 2011).   These effects in turn 
underpinned conflictual industrial relations and pervaded the conduct of collective 
bargaining (see Brown 1973; Edwards and Scullion 1982).  There is also widespread 
evidence of other forms of individual incentives being manipulated by employees, as in 
the findings from the stock options literature that top executives manipulate the timings 
of stock option awards and ‘reload’ options when prices fall (see Bebchuk and Fried 
2004; Yermack 1997; Brenner et al 2000).                     
  
A key element of recent incentives theory is the proposition that the addition of 
further incentives can ameliorate the measurement costs associated with individual 
incentives (Holmstrom and Roberts, 2004; Roberts, 2010).  Additional incentives such as 
profit sharing may reduce manipulation by enhancing cooperation and commitment.  PS 
may also mitigate the agent’s pursuit of insurance where risk is uncontrollable by 
signalling that employees will benefit from future company performance.  Measurement 
noise may be mitigated in inter-dependent work environments by collective schemes that 
focus on group rather than individual output.  Multiple incentives potentially soften 
distortion by rewarding a wider range of tasks and behaviour and limit workers’ 
opportunity to game incentives.  For these reasons a mix of individual and collective, or 
combinations of group incentives may be more effective than individual incentives in 
many workplaces.  By contrast, in those workplaces where measurement noise, distortion, 
and manipulation are low (because tasks are repetitive, simple and independent), 
 individual payment by results or single metric pay incentives may be effective on their 
own (cf. Gneezy et al., 2011; Kauhanen and Naparia, 2012; Rynes et al., 2005).     
 
Nevertheless, as has been widely observed in the literature, group-based 
incentives are not without their limitations.  One, the 1/N problem means that individual 
employees may ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of others.  Two, the ‘line of sight’ between 
individual work behaviour and payments determined by collective outcomes can be 
indirect and tenuous (Conyon and Freeman 2004).  These limitations are likely to 
increase with the size of the reward group, with those group-based incentives linked to 
company performance rather than group output likely to have very weak, perhaps non-
existent, incentive effects (Prendergast, 1999; Sesil, 2006).  In these terms, profit sharing 
is likely to have lower incentive power than group PBR systems because the line of sight 
between individual effort and payments is especially indirect.   
 
However, in practice profit sharing may be more effective than group PBR.  Net 
measurement and compliance costs in profit sharing are likely to be negligible because 
profits have to be calculated anyway for the annual company report.  Furthermore, group 
PBR may have negative effects that are not usually found in profit sharing.  One 
important limitation of group PBR is that work groups often develop informal norms 
restricting output, as has been observed from the Hawthorne studies onwards (Rose 
1975).   
 
The conjunction of individual PBR with group schemes may reduce free riding 
and may help to develop an appreciation of the ‘line of sight’ between individual and 
collective results by encouraging individuals to focus on linkages between their own 
performance and collective outcomes.  It may also deal with the sorting issue identified 
above.  Against this, rewarding individual and collective performance may set up a 
‘social dilemma’ for employees: which targets do they pursue?   
 
Surprisingly, there is little empirical evidence on the effects of multiple incentives 
despite the theoretical case for them.  An early study comparing the effects of hybrid 
 (individual and group) incentives against both individual and group incentives found that 
the mixed incentives performed worst (Wageman, 1995).  Recent studies have used 
experimental techniques to compare individual, group, and mixed incentives, and have 
found little evidence for the superior performance of mixed arrangements (Barnes et al., 
2010; Libby and Thorne, 2009).  It has been argued that mixed arrangements can be 
confusing for employees, and this detracts from any potential to get the ‘best of both 
worlds’.  These studies focused on the behavioural impact of combining incentives: what 
has been missing from the literature has been an empirical assessment of the impact on 
company or workplace economic performance.  Arguably, this is the ‘acid test’ of 
whether multiple incentives are worthwhile.  Accordingly, this paper assesses the effects 
of combining incentives on workplace productivity.   
 
Based on the reasoning presented so far, several predictions are used to guide the 
research.  One, in general, multiple incentives will be more effective than a single 
incentive scheme in terms of affecting the probability of high levels of productivity.  
Two, more specifically, the addition of a collective incentive scheme to an individual-
based scheme such as IPBR, or vice versa, will augment the productivity effects by more 
than the sum of the effects of the two incentive schemes.  Three, based on the view that 
the net limitations of GPBR are greater than those of PS, GBPR will be less effective than 
PS when added to IPBR.  Four, the combination of collective incentives such as GPBR 
and PS will be more effective than the use of IPBR by itself, highlighting the potential of 
apparently less powerful incentives to out-perform individual incentives.   
 
We further examine whether the effects of single and multiple incentive schemes 
are contingent on features of the work environment, given earlier findings on this issue 
(Belfield and Marsden, 2003: Brown, 1990).  As Kauhenan and Napari (2012) point out, 
the trade-offs between risks assumed by the worker and distortion of work tasks and 
behaviour are likely to depend on job and work characteristics.  In our research, the two 
key dimensions of task design examined are the extent of employee decision rights (task 
discretion) and the range of tasks (task variety).    
 
 Where a job is ‘narrow’ in terms of task range, the narrow performance measures 
typically found in individual payment by results are less likely to lead to distorted 
incentives, as they may capture all aspects of task performance that the employee 
undertakes.  Where there is task variety, the addition of incentives with a broader set of 
metrics can encourage workers to spread effort appropriately across tasks.   
 
As for task discretion, there are divergent perspectives in the literature concerning 
its moderating effects on the relationship between incentives and productivity outcomes..  
One perspective suggests that if task discretion is found when the production system is 
characterised by uncertainty and asymmetric information, incentives may be used to 
ensure that the worker makes the right decisions and to hold her to account (Prendergast, 
2002; Devaro and Kurtulus, 2010).  On this basis, individual payment by results may be 
expected to have positive productivity effects when there is task discretion.  Meanwhile, 
where worker discretion is low, individual incentives may have strong productivity 
effects because incentive payments compensate for boring, repetitive work without 
decision-making powers (‘compensating differentials’). 
 
Alternatively, individual payment by results (IPBR) may have adverse impacts by 
distorting the choices workers make where there is task discretion, and by enabling them 
to manipulate the incentive plan where they have superior information about work tasks. 
The worker may exploit discretion to pursue their own productivity-limiting preferences 
(e.g. to satisfice rather than optimise incentive payments), especially as individual 
incentives can convey low-trust signals from the employer (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 
2008).  If this is the case, the addition of other incentive systems may enhance 
productivity: group PBR may encourage cooperation with other workers (Sliwka, 2011) 
or impose peer pressure, whilst profit sharing may encourage workers with discretion to 
make decisions that are geared to bringing about good company performance.   
 
Based on this reasoning, and the earlier discussion of relevant theory, several 
predictions guide the analysis of contingency effects.   One, individual incentives will be 
effective in raising the probability of high levels of productivity in work contexts 
 characterised by low task variety or task discretion but not in those where there is high 
variety or discretion.  Two, adding collective incentives to individual incentives will have 
a complementary effect on productivity where there is high but not low task variety or 
discretion.  Three, of the two collective incentives, profit sharing will be more effective 
than GPBR in this regard.  Four, combinations of ‘weak’ incentives – GPBR and PS – 
will be more effective in work settings with high variety or discretion than those with low 
variety or discretion.   
 
3.Methodology 
 
The data used to address our questions come from the Management Questionnaire of the 
British Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 (WERS04).  This survey provides 
information on a range of incentive arrangements, both individual and group, as well as 
broader information on employment relations, employment practices, workplace 
characteristics and performance measures across all sectors of the British economy.  The 
sample is confined to private sector establishments because very few public sector 
workplaces have PS or GPBR.  With this exclusion, and after accounting for missing 
values, this gives a working sample for our productivity estimates of just over 1300 
workplaces. With the use of survey weights
 
to compensate for sample-selection biases 
and identified non-response biases (for more information see Kersley et al., 2006: 334–
335), and the use of the complex survey procedures in STATA, our results are nationally 
representative of private sector workplaces with 5 or more employees in Britain. 
 
Our analysis focuses on evaluating the productivity effects of different 
configurations of incentive arrangements: whether the schemes work independently, 
jointly, or all-together.  Our productivity equations are estimated using an ordered probit 
model since the dependent variable is composed of several categories: 
 
Y = (IPBR x GPBR  x PS) + Controls    (1) 
 
 The productivity equations include  all seven possible combinations of incentives  
arrangements – individual schemes (individual PBR, group PBR or profit sharing); joint – 
individual and profit sharing, individual and group, profit sharing and group; and the 
coexistence of all schemes.  We further model the productive impact of multi-incentives 
according to different elements of the work environment; namely the extent to which 
largest occupational grouping has variety in their work and discretion over how they do 
their work.  A series of four-way interaction models are run whereby the pay scheme 
interactions are supplemented by interactions using dummies to record whether 
workplaces have ‘high’ or ‘low’ levels of task variety and discretion.   
    
The dependent variable is based on respondents’ assessment of the labour 
productivity of the establishment relative to other workplaces in the same industry.  
Respondents are asked to rate their establishment’s performance in terms of five, ordered 
categories ranging from “a lot below average” to “a lot above average.” Overall, 52 
percent of workplaces report “above” or “a lot above average” productivity, with most of 
the remainder reporting average productivity (42 percent).  Much of our attention focuses 
on the 10 percent of workplaces whose labour productivity is “a lot above average” (i.e., 
the best performing workplaces).  Subjective performance measures of this type have 
been the subject of much debate and several investigations into their reliability and 
validity in the WERS series.  These investigations have shown that these subjective 
measures have clear and reasonably strong associations with alternative objective 
measures of performance, and both types have been found to have similar associations 
with a range of independent variables (Machin and Stewart, 1996; Haskel, 2005; Wall et 
al., 2004)
i
.  Furthermore, the explicit reference to performance relative to that in similar 
firms, normalises productivity performance in a way that can be challenging when 
objective measures of performance are used.  Thus, we have reasonable confidence that 
our variable provides a valid and acceptable measure of productivity.    
 
The key independent variables in the analysis related to various forms of incentive 
pay.  Individual PBR records the presence of a scheme which is based on individual 
performance or output.  Group PBR records the presence of one that is linked to measures 
 of team, workplace, or organizational performance.  The definition of performance in the 
survey is a quantitative or objective one, and is clearly differentiated from subjective 
evaluations of performance.   Profit sharing records the use of profit-related payments or 
bonuses to any employees in the workplace.  This is an incentive scheme that is a form of 
group-based incentive but is differentiated from the other group incentive by its broader 
performance metric.  In fact, the question relating to Group PBR explicitly excludes 
profit-related payments.  Each of these variables is coded on a 0,1 basis capturing the 
incidence of each type of incentive arrangement, and of groupings of schemes (see Table 
1)
ii
. Whilst the evidence suggests that each form of incentive pay is found in around one 
in five workplaces, this masks a more complex and nuanced configuration of incentives 
within firms. In all instances, the schemes are just as likely to operate alongside other 
incentive schemes as in isolation. Profit sharing is the most likely to exist alone but is 
also a widespread complement of both IPBR and GPBR. Indeed both individual and 
collective forms of PBR are more likely to exist with one or two other incentive 
arrangements than by themselves. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
A key issue concerns the coverage of these schemes given the posited effects on 
workplace performance.  Data on coverage indicates that individual incentives cover 
around half or more of the workforce in 61 per cent of workplaces, whilst GPBR and PS 
cover the majority (60 per cent plus) in 84 per cent of cases.  Thus, in most cases most 
workers are covered by the incentive schemes in question. 
 
In all specifications we control for a range of variables that might independently 
affect the level of labour productivity (see Appendix 1 for further details on variable 
construction). Thus we include controls for organizational size (Medium Organisation, 
Large Organisation, and Very Large Organisation), workplace age (Age), and for 
Workplace Size. We control for Workforce Composition using the percentage of blue 
collar workers in the workplace, and for the extent of Training using two dummies 
relating to the number of days of training provided per employee.  We include a measure 
 of Product Market Competition because this may influence the use of multiple incentives 
(see Pendleton et al., 2009) and it may affect the size of risk premiums that often 
accompany incentive schemes (Bloom and Milkovitch, 1998).  A dummy variable 
records Trade Union Recognition and, since earlier work shows that employee 
involvement practices can affect productivity, a measure for Involvement Practices is 
used (based on an additive scale of the number of direct involvement practices in the 
workplace).  The use of subjectively-determined Merit Pay is entered as a control.  This 
does not form a more substantial part of the analysis because it is conceptually distinct 
from the objective variable pay schemes that are the primary focus: the latter provide 
supplementary bonus payments based on objective performance measures whereas merit 
pay is usually based on subjective performance evaluations and in Britain is typically 
incorporated into base pay (as additional increments or increases within salary ranges).  
Finally, the regressions include a set of eleven industry dummies based on the twelve 
main industry sectors in the British Standard Occupational Classification 2003
iii
.   
 
In reporting our estimation results we note that the conventional output of limited 
dependent estimations (coefficients and standard errors) is not that insightful where the 
dependent variable is ordered and models involve numerous interaction terms.  A more 
meaningful interpretation and understanding of the underlying relationships in such 
models needs to be based on the reporting of marginal effects or predicted probabilities of 
the different incentive packages, as these can differ in both direction, size and statistical 
significance from the traditionally reported output of coefficients and standard errors 
(Norton and Ai, 2003). We therefore use the Stata margins command to calculate and 
report predicted probabilities and marginal effects.  In each case these results relate to the 
best performing workplaces (those that report ‘a lot better than average’ labour 
productivity). 
 
 
4. Results 
  
 The output of the various stages of our analysis is reported in Tables 2 through 5. All 
models are well specified and provide good explanatory power, as indicated by 
significant F statistics
iv
.  Across all models our list of control variables reveals 
statistically significant associations with our productivity measure (see Table 2, left hand 
column). Trade union recognition and larger organisations are associated with lower 
comparative productivity but training and merit pay are positively associated with the 
best performing firms. Neither employee involvement practices nor the skills composition 
of the workforce are significantly associated with labour productivity. 
 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 here. 
 
As with previous analysis of incentive arrangements, our baseline ordered probit 
model reports the independent effects of our incentive arrangements on labour 
productivity (see Table 2).  However in order to provide a clearer picture of the 
magnitude and effectiveness of these incentive arrangements we calculate predicted 
probabilities for the different outcomes and the resultant marginal effects of these 
‘independent’ incentive arrangements (see Table 3).  What emerges supports the 
contention that some group incentives outperform individual incentives. IPBR schemes 
marginally outperform the likelihood of reporting the highest level of productivity 
relative to workplaces without such arrangements (11.35 per cent as against 10.45 per 
cent) giving a small positive but statistically insignificant marginal effect (the difference 
between the two predicted probabilities) of less than 1 per cent. Workplaces with GPBR 
schemes fair even worse showing a lower probability of reporting the top level of labour 
productivity relative to firms without these arrangements (8.95 per cent versus 11.15 per 
cent), although the negative marginal effect is not statistically significant. Conversely, 
PS, apparently the ‘weakest’ of our incentive schemes in terms of incentive effects, is the 
only arrangement to show a statistically significant productivity enhancing effect, 
indicating that on average having such an arrangement will increase the probability of 
reporting ‘a lot better than average productivity’ by more than 5 percentage points 
compared to non-PS firms. 
 
 However, more often than not these schemes do not operate in isolation, thus 
questioning whether these results provide a true and fair representation of the 
effectiveness of these incentive schemes. As we will see, analysis of the configuration of 
incentive arrangements portrayed in Table 1 reveals a whole new story. 
 
Multiple incentives 
Following the format of our baseline model we report the coefficients and standard errors 
of our interaction model (Table 2, right hand column) and then calculate the predicted 
probabilities of reporting the highest level of labour productivity for all combinations of 
incentive schemes (see Table 4). In order to assess the extent to which the different 
incentive packages are performance enhancing, we can compare the predicted probability 
of each arrangement against a comparator workplace – those with no incentive 
arrangements (the first line in Table 4).   Instances where these differences are 
statistically significant are reported in the table. 
  
Insert Table 4 here. 
 
The productivity of our three incentive schemes varies according to whether they 
operate alone or alongside other incentives.  Schemes operated in isolation show fairly 
small differences in the predicted probabilities of achieving the highest levels of 
productivity from those workplaces with no incentive arrangements- our comparator 
group.  Combining two types of incentive arrangements reveal the most positive 
performance enhancing effects, but increasing this number to all three incentive schemes 
reduces the predicted probability of achieving very high productivity back to the level of 
the comparator group (i.e. no schemes). 
 
With regard to stand-alone schemes, our labour productivity estimates reveal that 
PS works somewhat better whilst IPBR and GPBR perform less well than the comparator 
group.  This is most marked in the case of GPBR which has only a 4.7 per cent chance of 
reporting ‘a lot better than average’ productivity as against the 10 per cent for workplaces 
with no incentive schemes (the difference being statistically significant at 0.01).  The 
 predicted probability of achieving the highest level of productivity with IPBR is 
somewhat lower than the comparator group (8 vs. 10 per cent), highlighting the potential 
limitations of this type of incentive
v
.  Where collective incentives complement IPBR the 
predicted probabilities of the highest level of productivity increase: in the case of GPBR 
the effect approximates to the additive effect of IPBR and GPBR, whereas there is a 
substantial increase when PS is combined with IPBR (35 per cent).  Thus, our first 
prediction is mainly but not fully borne out.  Multiple incentives are more effective than a 
single incentive except where profit sharing is used on its own.  The second prediction is 
met in that the addition of a collective incentive to an individual incentive increases the 
effects of the latter.  The third prediction, that PS will be more effective than GPBR in 
this respect, is also borne out.     
 
A notable finding is that the combination of GPBR and PS is an effective one.  
The predicted probability of the highest level of productivity is 23 per cent (significant at 
0.01).  This exceeds the probability where there are no schemes at all (10 per cent) and 
where IPBR is in operation (8 per cent).  This lends credence to Roberts’ (2010) view that 
a combination of apparently ‘weak’ incentives can be more effective than a single, 
individual-based incentive.  Thus, the fourth prediction is realised in our results. 
 
  Extrapolating from these results, the role and effect of PS stands out.  When 
combined with either IPBR or GPBR, there is a substantial increase in the predicted 
probability of the highest levels of labour productivity.   This is consistent with some 
experimental results relating to the effects of combining sharing and individual incentives 
on individual performance (Bellemare and Shearer, 2009).  The significant productivity 
effects of adding profit sharing are perhaps surprising given that PS appears to have very 
weak direct incentive effects due to the potential for free-riding (Prendergast, 1999).  
However, if PS is viewed as embodying gift-like features, bearing in mind that PS 
payments tend to be infrequent and usually un-contracted, the results are far more 
explicable.  If PS establishes relationships of reciprocity between employees and 
employer, through its contribution to perceptions of organisational justice (Coyle-Shapiro 
et al., 2002), prior tendencies to restrict effort and free-ride may well be mitigated 
 (Dodlova and Yudkevich, 2009).  It may also weaken any tendencies towards 
manipulation of asymmetric information (Fehr and Gachter, 2000), thereby also helping 
to account for the positive effects of the PS-IPBR combination.  However, reciprocity 
may be undermined when contracted incentives predominate – this may explain why the 
use of all three incentive schemes, including PS, has very weak effects on productivity 
compared with using no schemes at all.      
 
Multiple Incentives and the Work Environment 
Much of the previous literature on incentives recognises the contingent role of 
work settings in influencing the appropriateness and effects of incentives.  For instance, 
where workers have high levels of task discretion individual incentives may be less 
effective because of the capacity of workers to manipulate the scheme.  To investigate the 
role of work contexts further we replicate the analysis to distinguish between situations 
where there is high and low task discretion and variety.  To do this we add an additional 
interaction term to our previous analysis based on three-way interactions.  The various 
combinations of incentive schemes are further interacted with the dummy measures for 
each work context.  This analysis around the work environment provides a more nuanced 
interpretation of the aforementioned results in situations where the scope for noise, 
distortion and manipulation may arise. For each job characteristic – task variety and 
discretion, we report the predicted probability of reporting ‘best performance’ for each 
incentive combination depending upon whether they operate where the characteristics are 
deemed ‘low’ or ‘high’ (see Table 5).  In an earlier analysis, we also investigated these 
effects by splitting the sample by these work characteristics: the results were qualitatively 
very similar.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
The effects match expectations especially in the case of task discretion. Stand-out 
results relate to the efficacy of incentive arrangements involving IPBR. These strongest 
of incentives appear to work particularly well by themselves where workers have less 
discretion over how they do their work and thus little scope for distortion and 
 manipulation. In such instances they have a 22 per cent probability of being amongst the 
most productive firms, though a caveat is that this result is not significant at 10 per cent 
(it is significant at this level in the unreported split-sample results). Conversely, IPBR 
performs less well than ‘no incentives’ where there is scope (high task discretion) for 
employees to make decisions which reflect their preferences and which may well reflect 
the measurement limitations of IPBR schemes.  These results conflict with the argument 
made by some (eg. Devaro and Kurtulis, 2010) that IPBR ought to be effective in these 
circumstances because it encourages employees to make the right choices.  Seemingly, 
these effects can be overcome with the addition of PS and, to a much lesser extent, 
GPBR. This complementarity lifts the predicted probability of reporting a lot better than 
average productivity to 51 and 12 per cent respectively when task discretion is high. 
  
Indeed most of the best performing incentive arrangements are evident where 
workers have some freedom to choose what they do and how they do it. The broader 
metrics and attitudinal potential of PS seem to thrive under these conditions whether PS 
is operated in isolation or alongside PBR - individual and collective.  There is a 15 per 
cent probability of the highest levels of productivity where PS is used (compared with 11 
per cent where there is no scheme of any sort) but this increases to 31 per cent when used 
in combination with GPBR.  In each instance, the individual and combined effects of PS 
are much higher than in low discretion workplaces where this sort of incentive seems less 
appropriate.  However, GPBR schemes by themselves are ineffective in these 
circumstances, with a lower predicted probability of high productivity where there is high 
job discretion than low discretion (it is also lower than where there is no scheme at all).  
It is possible that there is greater capacity for the weaknesses of collective schemes, such 
as free-riding and group norms restricting output, to come to the fore when workers have 
greater freedom to organise their work.  In these circumstances, the reciprocity-inducing 
characteristics of profit sharing may come to the rescue, with a substantial and significant 
enhancement of the probability of high productivity being observed where PS and GPBR 
are combined.  However, even the efficacy of PS can be undermined when there are a 
large number of incentive schemes: the predicted probability of high productivity is lower 
when all three schemes are present than when there are no schemes at all.  The reduced 
 effectiveness of PS is consistent with Fehr and Gachter’s argument that reciprocity can be 
crowded-out by explicit incentives (2000).  Conversely, all three schemes are 
significantly more effective in low discretion environments suggesting that a wealth of 
incentives may compensate for boring work without decision-making powers.    
 
Turning to task variety, the pattern of incentive effects is similar.  In line with 
predictions, IPBR is highly effective in low task variety work settings (as indicated by a 
substantial improvement in the predicted probability of the highest levels of labour 
productivity compared with where incentive schemes are absent).  The addition of GPBR 
and PS has no effect in the case of the former and a simple additive effect in that of the 
latter.  In high variety work contexts, the results are rather different.  Here, as predicted, 
IPBR has an adverse effect on the probability of very high productivity.   Combining 
IPBR with GPBR has a small complementary effect whilst the combination of IPBR and 
PS has a substantial effect (as does the combination of GPBR and PS).  The combination 
of PS and IPBR, however, works well in both settings possibly by encouraging 
appropriate allocations of effort in high variety work environments and by ‘softening’ the 
hard edges of performance management in low variety contexts.  Combinations of GPBR 
and PS work very well in high variety settings, but not where there is low variety.  The 
use of all three schemes has small negative effects in high variety workplaces and small 
positive effects where there is little variety.   
 
In summary, the results for task variety and discretion support our predictions as 
follows.  One, individual incentives are indeed effective where there is low task variety or 
discretion, and harmful where there is high task variety or discretion.  Two, adding a 
collective incentive to an individual incentive has complementary effects where there is 
high task variety or discretion but it diminishes the effectiveness of individual incentives 
in workplaces with low task variety or discretion. Three, as predicted, profit sharing is 
more effective than GPBR in this respect in both high task variety and high discretion 
workplaces.  Four, combinations of so-called ‘weak’ incentives (profit sharing and other 
group incentives) are ineffective where there is low task variety or discretion but are 
effective in raising the probability of reporting high productivity where there is high 
 variety or discretion.  There is therefore a clear contingency dimension to our results: the 
nature of the work environment moderates the effects of incentives and combinations of 
them.   
 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
 
In the paper we posed three questions about the operation of incentives and combinations 
of them.  The first enquired whether combinations of incentives have a stronger impact 
on productivity than single incentives.  The answer is yes in most, but not all, instances.  
The second question asked more specifically about the addition of group to individual 
incentives.  Here it was found that the productivity effects of IPBR are increased when 
group incentives are added but the difference is not very large when it is GPBR that is 
added.  The effects are very much larger when it is PS that is added, and this provides an 
answer to the third question about the relative efficacy of GPBR and PS.  Our results 
show clearly that PS has stronger effects.  This also applies to the use of these schemes in 
isolation: in general PS works better.  A further result of interest is that there seems to be 
an optimal number of incentives schemes?  Our findings show that the use of all three 
incentives has negligible effects compared with using no schemes at all. 
 
Overall, our results provide empirical support for recent theory on the power and 
nature of incentives.  Individual incentives can have negative effects but these can be 
mitigated by the addition of group schemes with apparently weaker incentive power 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994; Gibbons, 1998).  We suggest that the capacity of the 
group incentives to mitigate the dysfunctional effects of higher-powered incentives by 
reducing distortion and manipulation is likely to be important here.  Recent theory has 
also suggested that weak incentives are likely to be optimal in certain work environments, 
such as where there is multi-tasking (Roberts, 2010).  Our results are mainly consistent 
with these claims.  For instance, IPBR has negative effects in high discretion work 
settings but these become mildly positive when GPBR is added and strongly positive 
 when profit sharing is added.    By contrast, where there is low task discretion there is 
evidence that IPBR may be effective on its own, presumably because there is limited 
noise and little opportunity for distortion and manipulation.  Our results contrast with 
recent findings in the literature that suggest that individual incentives can be effective 
where there is task discretion because they encourage workers to make the right decision 
(Devanna and Kurtulis, 2010). 
 
One important aspect of the results is that GPBR is indeed weak when operated 
on its own (cf. Sesil, 2006).  GPBR has weaker effects than PS, when operated singly or 
in conjunction with IPBR.  On the surface this is surprising because the incentive effects 
of PS would appear to be weaker than GPBR for a variety of reasons such as irregularity 
of payments and weak linkages to individual behaviour.  It becomes easier to explain if 
PS is viewed as means of generating reciprocity between employees and the firm (Coyle-
Shapiro et al., 2002)..  As with employee share ownership, it can signal management’s 
good intentions to the workforce.  The trust and commitment this generates may dampen 
the dysfunctional effects that can arise from the use of individual incentives, thereby 
explaining why the productivity effects are so much larger when PS is combined with 
IPBR.  Although the financial participation literature has shown that profit sharing has 
positive effects on productivity, it has so far considered these effects in isolation from 
other incentive schemes (see Perotin and Robinson, 2002).  Our findings therefore 
generate new and interesting insights into the effects of profit sharing.  Future research 
might explore and test these relationships further, perhaps using employee-level data.            
 
We are acutely conscious that our research only goes so far in investigating 
complementarities between forms of incentive pay, and that further research is necessary 
to clarify a range of issues.  For instance, we need to know more about the balance of 
positive and negative effects of specific types of incentive, and how these interact with 
those of other incentives.  This inevitably means that we need to observe the 
characteristics of schemes more fully, including the gearing and the performance metrics.  
Worker behaviour, as has been observed over the years in a succession of rich case 
studies, is also highly relevant.  Unfortunately, we do not have this information in our 
 data source, and we have had to make several important assumptions about how schemes 
operate and the strength of their effects, positive and negative.   
 
 The data source has also been criticised for its cross-sectional nature and the use 
of subjective evaluations of workplace performance.  However, WERS has been 
extensively used to investigate the effects of human resources and labour practices, and it 
is generally thought that the design strengths of the survey outweigh these limitations 
(Brown and Edwards, 2009).   In regard to these two specific limitations, the extant 
evidence from panel-based studies is consistent with the direction of causality postulated 
here (Kruse, 1993; Heywood et al., 2002; Jones and Kato, 1995), whilst extensive 
evaluation of the subjective performance measures has found them to correlate with 
satisfactorily with more objective measures (Haskel, 2005; Wall et al., 2004).  
  
As is common in research of this type, there is always the potential for 
endogeneity to bias the observed effects.  Unfortunately, responding to this potential 
problem is not at all straightforward given the nature of the variables and the data in the 
survey.  Endogeneity may take two forms in our research: the key dependent and 
independent variables may influence each other simultaneously, and omitted variables 
may bias the effects of key independent variables through their influence on the error 
term.  Whilst it is now possible to deal with endogeneity where there is a binary 
dependent variable by using instrumental variables and two stage regression procedures, 
it is not feasible to use standard instrumental variable procedures where the dependent 
variable takes an ordered, categorical form.   A further significant problem, as noted by 
Conyon and Freeman (2004), is the identification of suitable instruments given that many 
of the WERS survey questions are on connected themes.  In the survey there are no 
suitable measures that correlate highly with the key independent variables but not the 
dependent variable.  Conceptually, if there is an important omitted variable in our 
analysis, it is probably management quality as this may simultaneously affect both 
productivity and the decision to use incentive schemes.  As a somewhat imperfect 
substitute, we experiment with inserting an additional control that may proxy for 
management quality (whether the manager responsible for employee relations has a 
 formal HR qualification) in the main stage regressions, but the effect of this on the model 
and the magnitude of the pay system effects is negligible
vi
.   
 
Even with the limitations outlined above, we believe that our study makes a 
valuable contribution to the study of multiple incentives.  The research has provided 
empirical support for several important ideas on incentives that have currency in 
Personnel and Institutional Economics.  An important finding for the literature is that 
some mixed incentives do indeed give the ‘best of both worlds’ though others do not.  We 
have highlighted the role of profit sharing in this respect.  Our findings add to a growing 
strand of literature which suggests that behavioural insights need to be added to the 
standard agency model to fully understand the operation and effects of contingent 
rewards (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  It has 
also provided a new angle on human resource management complementarities, given that 
the literature to date has mainly examined relationships between incentive schemes and 
other HR practices rather than with each other.  Finally, the results provide an economic 
rationale for the widespread and growing use of multiple incentives in British 
workplaces. 
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 Table One: The Incidence of Multi-Incentives 
 (weighted percentage of workplaces) 
 
Incentive Arrangement Weighted   
 mean  
Individual PBR 19.57  
Group PBR 22.39  
Profit Sharing 19.30  
   
Of which: 
 
 
  
One Scheme Only   
Individual PBR 6.83  
Group PBR 6.91  
Profit Sharing 9.80  
   
Two Schemes   
Individual x Group PBR 7.06  
Individual PBR x PS 
ShSharing 
1.03  
Group PBR  x PS 3.77  
   
All three incentives 4.69  
   
 
         Workplaces with incentives    40.01  
 Table Two: Ordered Probit Estimates of ‘Independent’and Multi- Incentive 
Effects on Labour Productivity. 
    
 Independent  
 
 
 
 
 Multi-incentive 
effeffeeeffectsroductivity 
 
      
Independent Variables Coefficient Std. Error  Coefficient Std. Error 
      
Incentive Arrangements      
Individual PBR   0.0752 (0.1589)    -0.1119 (0.2388) 
Group PBR  -0.1195 (0.1373)  -0.4248*** (0.1640) 
Profit Sharing   0.2806** (0.1360)    0.1465 (0.1847) 
      
   Individual x group 
 
 
     0.6679** (0.3178) 
  Individual x profit sharing      0.9248 (0.6342) 
  Group x profit sharing      0.8469** (0.3417) 
      
    Ind. x group x profit 
sharing 
    -2.0450*** (0.7420) 
      
Controls      
Merit pay 0.3274** (0.1473)    0.3010** (0.1487) 
Involvement practices   0.0255 (0.0288)    0.0253 (0.0285) 
Trade union recognition  
Recognition 
-0.2883** (0.1329)  -0.2856** (0.1349) 
Workforce composition 
 Composition 
  0.0020 (0.0020)    0.0022 (0.0020) 
Pr d. market competition   0.0512 (0.1031)    0.0391 (0.1001) 
Age  0.0020*** (0.0007)    0.0020*** (0.0007) 
      
[Training 0-2 days]      
Training (2-5 days) 
 
  0.3035** (0.1491)    0.3217** (0.1444) 
Training (5 or more 
days) 
 0.4351*** (0.1454)    0.4511*** (0.1435) 
      
Workplace size 
 
-0.0003 (0.0002)    -0.0003* (0.0002) 
     
[Small 0rg]      
Medium organization -0.3041* (0.1633)  -0.2965* (0.1671) 
Large organization -0.1782 (0.1803)  -0.1613 (0.1804) 
Very large organization -0.3762** (0.1828)  -0.3752** (0.1801) 
      
Industry dummies Yes   Yes  
      
Cut1/ -2.1595*** (0.3154)  -2.1671*** (0.3187) 
Cut2/ -1.0341*** (0.2139)  -1.0374*** (0.2063) 
Cut3/  0.5115** (0.2091)    0.5239*** (0.2017) 
Cut4/  1.9201*** (0.2231)    1.9514***  (0.2155) 
      
F 3.15***   3.23***  
N 1304   1304  
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
 
 
 
 Table Three: Independent Incentive Arrangements 
Predicted Probabilities of Achieving Highest Level of Labour Productivity 
 
  Labour Productivity  
Incentive Arrangement Coeff Incentive 
absent 
Incentive 
present 
Marginal 
Effect 
     
Individual PBR 0.0752 0.1042*** 0.1175*** 0.0132 
 (0.1589) (0.0148) (0.0280) (0.0288) 
     
Group PBR -0.1195 0.1115*** 0.0918*** -0.0198 
 (0.1373) (0.0161) (0.0194) (0.0222) 
     
Profit Sharing 0.2806** 0.0968*** 0.1499*** 0.0532* 
 (0.1360) (0.0137) (0.0304) (0.0287) 
     
 ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
       
  
  
Table Four: Multi-Incentive Arrangements 
Predicted Probabilities of Achieving Highest Level of Labour Productivity 
 
 
Incentive Arrangement 
 
Predicted 
Probability 
Std Error Adjusted 
Wald Test 
Individual 
PBR 
Group  
PBR 
Profit 
Sharing 
  F stat F sign 
0 0 0 0.1002*** (0.0156) [Comparator Category] 
      
1 0 0 0.0830** (0.0341) 0.25 (0.6191) 
       
0 1 0 0.0468*** (0.0149) 8.46***  (0.0037) 
       
0 0 1 0.1265*** (0.0358) 0.56 (0.4562) 
       
1 1 0 0.1236*** (0.0323) 0.50 (0.4811) 
       
1 0 1 0.3532* (0.1997) 1.60 (0.2058) 
       
0 1 1 0.2279*** (0.0762) 2.85*  (0.0917) 
       
1 1 1 0.1009*** (0.0371) 0.00 (0.9851) 
      
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
 
 Table Five: Multi-Incentive Arrangements and Job Characteristics 
Predicted Probabilities of Achieving the Highest Level of Labour Productivity 
 Task Variety  Task Discretion  
 Low  High Wald test Low High Wald test 
Incentive Arrangement Predicted 
Probability 
(Std. Error) 
Predicted 
Probability 
(Std. Error) 
F 
 
(F sign) 
Predicted 
Probability 
(Std. Error) 
Predicted 
Probability 
(Std. Error) 
F 
 
(F sign) 
Individual 
PBR 
Group 
PBR 
Profit 
Sharing 
      
0 0 0 0.0632*** 0.1073*** 4.10** 0.0766*** 0.1052*** 2.06 
   (0.0201) (0.0171) (0.0431) (0.0191) (0.0174) (0.1510) 
         
1 0 0 0.2531** 0.0667** 2.41 0.2249 0.0537** 0.94 
   (0.1174) (0.0313) (0.1211) (0.1748) (0.0243) (0.3321) 
         
0 1 0 0.0834** 0.0369*** 1.22 0.0514** 0.0411*** 0.14 
   (0.0418) (0.0133) (0.2689) (0.0252) (0.0156) (0.7056) 
         
0 0 1 0.0825 0.1287*** 0.25 0.0749* 0.1543*** 1.81 
   (0.0857) (0.0379) (0.6181) (0.0388) (0.0490) (0.1793) 
         
1 1 0 0.2245 0.1149*** 0.40 0.1211* 0.1175*** 0.00 
   (0.1705) (0.0318) (0.5255) (0.0687) (0.0347) (0.9616) 
         
1 0 1 0.3355*** 0.3521* 0.01 0.0120 0.5096** 6.13** 
   (0.0675) (0.2114) (0.9415) (0.0227) (0.2002) (0.0135) 
         
0 1 1 0.0783** 0.2799*** 4.29** 0.1104 0.3144*** 2.80* 
   (0.0309) (0.0956) (0.0386) (0.0838) (0.0914) (0.0947) 
         
1 1 1 0.0933* 0.0980*** 0.01 0.2177*** 0.0740** 2.95* 
   (0.0490) (0.0376) (0.9367) (0.0781) (0.0346) (0.0859) 
         
  F 3.78***  3.35***  
  N 1303  1303  
                         ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 Appendix One Variables 
Variable Name Variable type Mean  
 
Individual 
performance pay 
 
Workplace has a payment by results scheme based on individual 
performance/output in which non-managerial employees have received 
payment (1/0) 
 
0.1957  
Group performance 
pay 
 
Workplace has a payment by results scheme based on 
group/workplace/organisational measures in which non-managerial  
employees have received payment (1/0) 
 
0.2239 
 
Profit sharing 
 
Workplace has a profit sharing scheme in which non-managerial 
employees have received payment in the past 12 months (1/0) 
 
0.1930  
 
Control Variables 
  
Merit Pay Workplace has a merit pay system in which non-managerial employees 
participate (1/0) 
 
0.1445  
Involvement 
practices 
Additive scale of the number of direct involvement schemes in 
operation in each workplace (meetings between senior management and 
entire workforce + team briefings + quality circles + surveys + 
suggestion schemes + management chain (systematic cascading of 
information) + notice board + newsletter). 
 
3.61  
 
Trade union 
recognition 
Trade union is recognized by management for negotiating pay and 
conditions (1/0) 
 
0.1540  
Blue collar workers 
(%) 
Proportion of the workforce who are ‘blue-collar’ workers. 21.86  
Competition Workplace faces a very high degree of product market competition (1/0) 0.3890  
 
Training(2-5) 
 
Majority of the largest occupational group receive between 2 and 5 days 
training per year (1/0) 
 
 
0.1653 
Training(5 or 
more) 
Majority of the largest occupational group receive 5 or more days 
training per year (1/0) 
 
0.1202  
Workplace size Number of employees in the workplace 28.21  
 
Medium-sized 
organisation 
 
Organization as a whole has between 250 and 999 employees (1/0) 
 
0.0645  
 
Large organisation 
 
Organization as a whole has between 1000 and 4999 employees (1/0)  
 
0.1157  
 
Very large 
organisation 
 
Organization as a whole has more than 5000 employees (1/0) 
 
0.2254  
 
Age  
 
Age of the workplace (years) 
 
 
30.76 
Job Characteristics   
Task Variety To what extent does the largest occupational group (LOG) have variety 
in how they do their work (1/0) (High = Some/A lot; Low =Little/No) 
0.8397 
 
 
Task Discretion 
 
To what extent does the LOG have discretion over how they do their 
work (1/0) (High = Some/A Lot; Low = Little/No) 
 
0.7083 
 
  
                                                 
i
 WERS2004 included objective measures of performance but their use in the current study is precluded by 
limitations in these data.  Only a minority of trading workplaces completed the relevant questionnaire, and 
not all of these based their answers on the workplace (Forth and McNabb 2008).  Resulting sample attrition 
would have made the research unworkable because of the very small number of cases left in some pay 
scheme categories.  Using subjective productivity data was judged to be reasonable in the circumstances if 
by no means ideal.    
 
ii
 Ideally we would use more qualitative measures of these variable pay systems such as the number of 
employees covered by them.  Although WERS asks about the proportion of the non-managerial workforce 
who received payments in the previous year, we cannot use this information because it does not 
differentiate between individual and collective PBR.  However, it is worth noting that overall over 60 per 
cent of employees have received payments from some scheme in the previous year in over 60 per cent of 
workplaces.  
 
iii
 Initially we experimented with inclusion of a control for foreign ownership but this was always 
insignificant and had no appreciable impact on model fit or other coefficients.  We therefore excluded it 
from the reported models. 
 
iv
 Pseudo R2 and the likelihood ratio test are not appropriate when weighted data is used with the svy 
command in Stata. 
  
v
 It is important to note that splitting the individual PBR variable by coverage indicates that the more 
workers are covered by the scheme the more negative the effects on productivity.  This is consistent with 
the argument that individual incentives generate dysfunctional employee behavior. 
 
vi
 The results are not shown here for reasons of brevity but are available from the authors on request 
